THE DOCTRINE OF FRUSTRATION AS APPLIED TO
CONTRACTS.

A recent decision in the Circuit Court of Appeals of the 4th
Circuit I points to the conflict, ever recurrent in the administration of the law, between the application of the fixed and defined
rules of law and the attempt of individual judges to apply their
own ideas of equity and justice to particular cases as they arise.
The opinion of the court in the Gans case, supra, is largely
taken up with an argument designed to show the right and power'
of the Court to "do justice" as the Court views it, and the result
achieved by the decree of the Court is the establishment of the
"Equities" between the contracting parties as the particular court
thinks they should be established.
Circuit Judge Woods uses the following language:
"True, this is an inquiry into the equity of the matter, in the
sense of inquiry into the justice of the controversy. But it is in no
sense an inquiry belonging exclusively to a court of equity. Even.
common law courts constantly decide causes on grounds of .fraud,
mistake, unjust enrichment, and other grounds sometimes thought
of as peculiar to courts of equity. Courts of admiralty have often
decided cases on the equities which arise incidentally in the exercise
of their jurisdiction."
This case is -a convenient starting point, affording as it does
differences in point of view as to the manner and method of administering justice, from which to approach some recent decisions of no little importance to the evergrowing body of American Commercial Law.
The proper theory underlying the administration of the
English Common Law, is that Judicial Decision should be
founded on evidence and its boundaries should be within the evidence, and should not be in the twilight zone beyond the boundaries of evidence when the evidence fails to afford requisite certainty.
192t;

Isles Steamshipping Co. v. Gans Steamship Line; decided November ,
not yet reported.
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But in the most careful adherence to this theory of judicial
decision, the struggle of a rule of practical character to emerge
from the necessities of modern commerce and become recognized
as a rule of law, is one fraught with interest.
The development of the rule itself will depend not only upon
the circumstances in which the controversy calling for the application of the rule is involved, when presented to the Court, but
also upon whether the particular court inclines more strongly
toward a strict application to the evidence of the definite rules of
law, or, impelled by an individual desire, toward arriving at the
"equities of the case" as they may appeal to the particular court
at the time, disregarding or misapplying the definite rule of law,
and thus plunging the rules of law into uncertainty.
The former method involves a nice adjustment or expansion
of the reason of the rule to the solution of the question presented.
by the combination of the facts in evidence.
The latter method generally results in the situation described
by the phrase-"Hard cases make bad law."
Perhaps as good an illustration as any of the latter method
will be found i n the remarks of the District Court Judge, in the
case now under discussion, during the oral argument:
"It depends, in fact, upon whether you are more interested in
principles than in doing actual justice. Officially I am bound by
principles, but only officially. Where it is necessary for the preservation of some set of rules, it is a poor judge, when he finds himself
faced by what appears to be a principle in a particular case, which
leads in that case to the breaking of justice, does not take that principle up and turn it over and examine and squeeze it and press it, and
see if, after all, whether the form in which it has sometimes been
stated is the real principle or not. Sometimes he finds it is, and sometimes for broad general reasons-He ought never to do it until he has
struggled as hard as he can to find out how the real heart of the principle can be preserved and justice done, and usually, if he struggles
hard enough, the desired result is obtained."2
And again, later in the argument:
"All I want to hear from you about is the legal principles as
applied principally to the question of whether this should not be
treated as a real frustration. If it is not to be treated as a real frus'Transcript of Record, U. S. C C. A., p. 404.

DOCTRIXE OF FRUSTRATION AS APPLIED TO COINTRACTS 89

tration, I will find s6me way to give them those rights and I am not
greatly bothered about the various technicalities. They can be reasoned around well enough." 3
When the rule in Paradine v. Jane 4 was inflexibly followed,
it was found that while applicable simpliciterto the hard and fast
requirements of the law affecting real property, it must be modified when applied to the more flexible character of the everchanging manner of men in dealing with one another respecting
personal contracts [as distinguished from Real Property contracts], and so the rule can be found changing form under the
facts as presented in such cases as Taylor v. Caldwell, 5 Krell v.
Henry," Horlock v. Beal,7 etc.
The first is a case where a hired Music Hall was burned before occupancy could be had; the second, where a flat was hired
for certain days to view the Coronation procession, which was
postponed; and, the third, a suit for wages by a seaman whose
English ship was detained by Germany on the outbreak of the
War.

How the rule is understood is evidenced not only in the
manner of statement, but in the name given to it. This is to be
especially remarked in the consideration of the cases we are
about to discuss.
The English Courts speak of "The Doctrine of Commercial
Frustration," "The Commercial Frustration of the Adventure,"
"The Putting of an end in a commercial sense to a commercial
speculatioui." The Courts of the United States refer to what has
been said to be the identical rule, as the doctrine of "Impossibility
of Performance," or of "Supervening Impossibility of Performance."

The word "frustration" does not connote impossibility, and
the cases even in the United States Courts where the rule has
been applied, are not all cases where performance of the contract
'Id., p. 411.
"Aleyn 26 (Eng. 1647).
'3 B. & S. 826 (Eng. 1863).
'L R. (19o3), 2 K. B. 740 (Eng.).
'L..R (zgx6), z A. C. 86 (Eng.).
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was rendered actually impossible, but only rendered so difficult of
performance as to be regarded as not possible in the eyes of the
law, that is to say, not required to be done because impliedly not
undertaken to be done.
The American Courts have been slow to adopt the phraseology of the English Courts. The term "frustration" is not
found, or, at least, not frequently found, in the language of the
American Courts dealing with this phase of contract law.
However, in the opinion of the very able District Judge in
the case first above-mentioned, reported under the title "The Isle
of Mull,"" the Court, after speaking of the contract as having
become "in a substantial sense impossible," proceeds to inquire if
there has been "an actual frustration, either of their mutual purpose or of the purpose of either of them," and later adverts to a
conclusive presumption of law involving "a constructive frustration," and still later in the opinion speaks of the "modem doctrine of frustration."
Is there a "modern doctrine of frustration" to be found in
the present body of American law, and how far have its limits
and boundaries been defined?
Regardless of the terminology, the American Courts have
treated the effect of certain subsequent events on the obligation
of performance on one side or the other of a contract, as either to
defeat or to frustrate the intention of the parties, and, therefore,
to nullify the obligations of the contract.
This view of the American Courts finds authoritative expression in the case of the "Kronprinzessin Cecilie." The contract there was to deliver specie upon the terms and for the freight
monies agreed upon. It was as absolute a covenant as the one
in Paradine v. Jane, supra, because the Court refused to apply the
Restraint of Princes Clause as stretching it beyond its literal intent, but the Court found that the parties had impliedly undertaken that the covenant would not be performed -in the event
which indicated a commercial frustration of the enterprise.
'257 Fed. 798 (1919).

'244 U. S. 12 (1917).
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And it is well to remark here that the event which went to
defeat, in a commercial sense, the performance of the contract,
was one which affected the performance of the contract by one of
the parties only. It was in evidence that the freight had been
paid and that the contract could have been performed by steaming the vessel under forced draft to Plymouth; but the Court
held, in effect, that though the performance of the contract was
still possible by the defendant, the common sense of the situation
required the conelusion that performance was defeated in a commercial sense.
The result of this decision is entirely proper, but the application of the rule thus evolved and enunciated as the rule of common sense does not seem to find ready response in all the Courts.
The recent decisions of the District Court for the Eastern
District of Maryland, known as the Baltimore Coal Cases,1° seem
to revert to the rule as applied previous to the decision in the
"Kronprinzessin Cecilie," and rest upon the theory of Impossibility of Performance, and where there was a showing of a possibility of performance, to leave the parties to the contract to their
bargain regardless of whether or not, in a commercial sense, the
event which went to defeat the object of the parties, was one
which, from a common sense viewpoint, rendered the commercial
object of the contract frustrate.
In the Baltimore Coal Cases, supra, the contracts were
wholly executory, and changing economic conditions, entirely beyond the control of the parties [largely influenced by Governmental regulation], had presented such a wide difference in the
aspect of affairs at the time fixed for performance that it was
scarcely open to serious question that the parties at the time of
making the contract would have agreed together, in the phrase of
one of the English Judges--If that happen, then all is over between uis
But the Court ignored the question of frustration in a commercial sense and founded its decision on the fact of possibility
" Romney v. McNeil, 273 Fed. 287 (921); Western Counties Shipping
Co. v. McNeil, 273 Fed. 298 (i921); Hcllenc Transport Steamship Co. v.
McNeil, 273 Fed. 29o (gzr); Compagne Navigazione Sota v. Diamond Fuel
Co., 273 Fed. -9W (i92x); Canute v. Diamond Fuel Co., 273 Fed. 3ox (1921).
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or impossibility of performance, deciding- the question on what
it was found that others, not similarly situated, found it possible
to do under different circumstances and conditions. Certainlylittle consideration was given to the English thought, as expressed
by Maule, J., in Moss v. Smith:"
"In matters of business a thing is said to be impossible when it
is not practicable, and a thing is impracticable when it can only be
done at an excessive or unreasonable cost";
or to the still later thought, expressed by Lord Parmoor in the
.Metropolitan Water Board Case:22
"The real meaning and purport of such a contract is that works
shall be carried out at prices fixed with reference to the then outlook for cost of labour, plant, and material, spread over a defined
limit of time, which could not fail to affect materially the figures inserted by any contractor in sending in his tender."
It is true that the English Pre-War Contract Committee's
Report 13 provides that mere increased cost should not be sufficient, but adds the significant words "unless to an enormous and
extravagant extent," or unless "the pecuniary burden is so great
as to approximate to physical prevention.'
No American case has apparently considered the question
of increased cost as in any degree an available defence, no matter how enormous or extravagant, and in the consideration of
what may defeat the objects of the parties, the pendulum would
seem to swing backward and forward.
The "Kronprinzessin Cecilie,"-decided by the Supreme Court
on May 7, 1917, apparently was not before the District Court
in New York, in the decision on May 28, 1917, of "The
Themis,"1 4 when the Court decided that mere financial loss, however serious, could not affect the obligations of the parties to a
contract.
C. B. 94 (z8so), cited by Lord Blackburn in DalW v. Nelson, L. R., 6

A. C. 38 (i881), at page 5Z.
0

L. R. 0918), 1 A. C. zi.
0 See. 1o, Cd.8975, of 19T&
2444 Fed. 545 (1917).
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In that case the slide in the Panama Canal presented a subsequent change in the situation which materially affected the contract of the parties, although the Court gave the fact no effect.
But the Baltimore Coal Cases, supra, really involved the
transportation of a large quantity of coal at fixed prices to foreign
customers, some of whom, indeed, were Governmental agencies,
and although the contracts for transportation took the form of
charter parties on individual ships, they were in reality tonnage
contracts, and were not in the nature of time charter parties, and
were not to be ruled by those cases which hold that, despite the
inteference with the use of' the ship, the charterer is still able,
and therefore required, to pay the money due on the charter hire
under his covenant to do so.25
The unprecedented rise, to extravagant heights, of the cost
of coal,- the extraordinary concentration of hundreds of vessels
at the coal loading ports on the North Atlantic, the consequent
rapid and disproportionate fall in the price of tonnage, and the
subsequent cancellation of contracts and commitments on the part
of European buyers, incident to the extraordinarily rapid change
in all the factors of the trade, produced a situation materially
affecting the figures on which all costs were based in the contracts made by the contractor, and presented an enormous and extravagant difference in the pecuniary burden of the coal contractor, certainly great enough to approximate physical prevention, and in reality rendered it financially, if not also physically,
impossible for the coal contractor to fulfill his commitments; yet
these facts, one or all, singly or together,'were apparently given no
consideration in the judicial decision of the District Judge to hold
the contractor liable on his covenants.
But certain it seems to be that there is a "modern doctrine
of frustration" in the American lav. The very language of the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in certifying the
questions involved to the Supreme Court in Allanwilde Transport Corporation v. Vacuum Oil Company, 0 indicates this clearly.
Clyde, etc., S. S. Co. v. Vest India S. S. Co., 169 Fed. 275 (1909).

248 U. S.377 (1919).
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The first question was:
"Was the adventure frustrated, and was the contract evidenced
by the charter-party and by the bill of lading issued to the Oil Company dissolved, so as to relieve the carrier from further obligation
to carry the oil?"
The third question propounded was in the same form:
"Was the adventure frustrated, and was the contract evidenced
by the bill of lading issued to Pidwell dissolved, so as to relieve the
carrier from further obligation to- carry, the nails?"
.The Supreme Court answers the -questions in the affirmative
and says that:
"The condition was, therefore, so far permanent as naturally
and justifiably to determine business judgment and action depending
upon it."
It dearly follows from this that the Courts will regard the
conditions submitted to them in a particular case, and will decide the question of frustration with a view to the facts that
"determine business judgment and action depending upon it."
This certainly is a wide departure from the earlier harsh rule
in Paradine v. Jane, supra, and seems more consonant with good
judgment and sound sense.
But what the limits of the rule are cannot be stated. The
doctrine is still a growing one, and perhaps not yet fully recognized in the Courts of First Instance in this country, but it is a
proper one, and its limits will finally be determined in the course
of the consideration of the various cases that will arise for authoritative decision by the Appellate Courts of this country.
William J. Conlen.
Philadelphia,Pa.

